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examines the current impediments to effective cybersecurity workforce preparation and offers new concepts to create Cyber Sentries through realistic training, network authorities tied to certification, and ethical training. These actions present an opportunity to significantly enhance workforce quality and allow the Department to operate effectively in the contested cyber domain in accordance with the vision established in its Strategy for Cyberspace Operations.
CYBER SENTRIES: PREPARING DEFENDERS TO WIN IN A CONTESTED DOMAIN
The development and retention of an exceptional cyber workforce is central to DoD's strategic success in cyberspace… -Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on its cyber networks for its business, intelligence and warfighting functions. The Department currently manages 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices at all levels of security classification to exploit the advantages provided by modern technologies and networked communication. 1 With expanding network employment, a critical DOD objective must be to ensure the long-term efficacy and security of military networks in the face of increasingly sophisticated state-and non-state cyber threats. To this end, DOD will significantly enhance its cyber defense capabilities by updating the methods by which we develop the cyber workforce. This paper examines the current cybersecurity training and certification methodology to determine the impediments to effective workforce preparation and provides new concepts to improve workforce development. Ultimately, these concepts will prepare DOD "Cyber Sentries" to operate effectively in the contested cyber domain and to provide the protection required to support U. S. military freedom of action in cyberspace.
DOD continues to expand its reliance on cyber capabilities and advanced information systems for all operations. For instance, during 2010 the Department allowed its components to access commercial social media and social networking sites to exploit modern "Web 2.0" capabilities. 2 At the same time, attacks against government networks continue to rise. The U.S. Government reported a 400% increase in cyber incidents from 2006 to 2009. 3 Currently, DOD sustains millions of network probes daily, each seeking to exploit potential vulnerabilities in Department cyber networks. Additionally, advanced hacking and attack tools are increasingly capable and available to a variety of malicious cyber operators. Through successful breaches of government security systems, unauthorized personnel have retrieved "thousands of files from U.S. networks." 4 Threat actors in cyberspace include foreign intelligence services, malicious insider threats, and individuals and groups with criminal or political intent.
Any of these threat actors can potentially compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of DOD information and systems. 5 A high-quality cybersecurity workforce is critical to the success of security efforts designed to better protect information systems. The cybersecurity workforce, also called the information assurance (IA) workforce, includes system administrators, network operators, approving officials, privileged users and information assurance personnel. They operate and defend DOD networks, investigate anomalies, mitigate network disruptions, and implement the technical and policy controls that protect U.S.
systems. 6 Highlighting their importance, the 2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace stated people "are the Department's first line of defense in sustaining good cyber hygiene and reducing insider threats." 7 Unfortunately, deficiencies in the training and certification regime in use to prepare the cyberdefense workforce undermine DOD's ability to adequately address current threats. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the current certification regime provides a "false sense of security," due in part to a focus on security processes which do not correlate with the technical skills required to recognize, prevent and mitigate network security intrusions. 8 Others have been unconvinced of the efficacy of certification programs, calling for operationally-focused training and performance evaluation to better serve cybersecurity personnel. 21 Some sustainment training regimens do not require study of changing adversary tactics, tools or trends in the cyber environment.
Simply put, "We have not developed our way of thinking to grasp an active defense against external threats that will both prevent penetration and neutralize threats discovered inside our networks." 22 Second, the current methodology uses training and evaluation methods that are sub-optimal, leading to inadequate performance on DOD networks. According to a 2010 Verizon Report on government data breaches, cyber workforce errors, including poor decisions and misconfigurations are a "contributing factor in nearly all data breaches." 23 These errors point to a need for performance-based training and testing on skills that technicians and other defenders will perform on the network in addition to their knowledge-based requirements. Although some qualifying certification programs do provide hands-on training and performance evaluation, the cyber Workforce Improvement Program does not make this mandatory or demand training in the face of an adaptive simulated threat.
Third, such errors reveal an unacceptable tolerance for performance errors despite the risks they impose. While most certification programs are rigorous and demanding, those that require knowledge-based evaluation are simply unable to examine and correct performance errors, nor can they instill an imperative to find and correct such flaws. Additionally, based on the perceived priority of network service delivery, commands sometimes accept risk in cybersecurity in favor of network service availability with unintended effects on the attitudes of cyber operators. 24 Based on these factors, defenders may not internalize their professional duty to protect DOD networks and information. Unfortunately, simply hardening one's own network through the implementation of security controls and policies has proven insufficient to enable defense. Threat actors, using increasingly capable "hacking" tools are growing more sophisticated in their ability to attack networks and exploit the numerous vulnerabilities found in current network hardware, making the job of the defender ever more difficult. In fact, an expert DOD security evaluator maintained, "A well trained system administrator beats an intrusion detection device in terms of accuracy and speed." 25 Also, the speed of exploitation is increasingly outpacing the speed of defense-that is, the time it takes an attacker to identify, develop and employ an "exploit" to a previously unknown network vulnerability is generally less than the time to identify the vulnerability and then build, test and apply a "patch" to the exposure over a large network.
Therefore, even with good efforts to apply proper security protocols and practices, threat actors will likely have some success in compromising DOD networks.
One senior cyber official explains, current computer network defense practice "is fundamentally reactive, not the predictive system used in the other operational domains… The approach fails in an information-age environment where software can be altered in minutes to completely change the nature of a threat." 26 Consequently, network defenders who currently focus only on building their defense lack skills to thwart, find and expel unauthorized network users.
Fifth, the significance of cybersecurity is diminished due to the low priority it receives within the overall DOD 8570.01M training framework. 27 While there is generally some security training provided in these and similar programs, the detailed security certification training required by DOD guidance can occur later, frequently decoupled from network services instruction.
This decoupling seems to reduce emphasis on cyber defense tasks. Those untrained in network operations and service delivery will generally not be granted elevated privileges on operational networks due to the potential risks posed by their lack of skill and ability. Yet, since certification is required within six months of assignment to an IA role, cyber technicians will normally have privileged network access within this period, albeit with supervision by a certified colleague. Such privileged users may be provided elevated security permissions to access system control, monitoring, administration, criminal investigation, or compliance functions on their networks. 28 In short, although the intent of the Manual is to "Provide warfighters qualified IA personnel in each category, specialty and level," the workforce improvement program allows uncertified personnel to hold important security positions for long periods. 29 This lowered "price for admission" increases the potential for mistakes and may make security seem less vital to network operators, supervisors and unit commanders.
Last, and most significant is the lack of realism in initial and sustainment training to prepare personnel for operations within the difficult and dangerous cyber battlespace.
Allowing the cyber workforce to operate on "live" networks without understanding realistic attacks and associated consequences ensures both their inability to prevent threats and their propensity to approach threats without the seriousness that they deserve. However, this contradicts both joint guidance and real-world requirements.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has stated "Everyone required to conduct military operations will be trained under realistic conditions and to exacting standards, prior to execution of those operations." 30 Our cyber community is not receiving the rigorous training and evaluation that CJCS demands, to the detriment of DOD network security.
Imperatives and Options for Improvement
The Department requires a means to create a workforce of highly capable 'Cyber Sentries' who can better protect government networks and associated information.
Analysis of the above issues reveal three imperatives for DOD workforce development modifications, including (1) increased realism in training, (2) authority in workforce roles tied to certification, and (3) a standard of professional ethics to guide the cybersecurity workforce. Significant benefit may accrue if these principles undergird changes to the cybersecurity workforce improvement program.
Increasing Realism. Training and certification programs must be made more realistic. Cyber operators must understand both the environment within which they operate and the adversary who is probing and attacking DOD networks. Joint doctrine specifies that understanding the operational environment, including relevant enemy, friendly and neutral systems, is fundamental for clear decisionmaking, effective force employment and military problem-solving. 31 To accomplish this goal, cyber operators must study and practice against adversary attack and exploitation methods. They must learn best practices to counter the adversary and rehearse how to continue effective network operations in cyberspace during significant attacks. Adversary-focused training is critical to cyber defense-it lifts the fog of uncertainty concerning threat activities and reveals adversary attributes that can be exploited for improved security. A step further in this regard would be to train advanced DOD cybersecurity professionals to operate offensively in cyberspace. Such skills would increase their knowledge of enemy techniques and procedures, and potentially offer a recruitment population for DOD's more demanding computer network attack and exploitation cadre. In either case, study of the enemy, environment and cyber attack concepts will increase realism by focusing on real-world problems and tactics and by providing a baseline of defensive performance skills to train and evaluate. The cybersecurity community must apply Sun Tzu's famous warfighting tenet, "Know your enemy and yourself" if they are to achieve success. 32 Such a realistic training program requires simulation to allow the cybersecurity force to enhance and evaluate individual performance-and "allow error without consequence''-before operating in a "live" network environment. 33 In the cyberspace domain, simulation may simply require a network disconnected from users or Internet resources. More advanced cyber training "ranges" can be developed to support instrumentation, automated adversaries or Red Team activities, simulated network subscribers and other sophisticated tools. Whether simple or complex, such an environment would allow learning through interaction with a simulated adversary and/or problem-solving against increasingly difficult cyber events. 34 In addition, competition against or cooperation with other network operators and defenders can be employed as a training method in simulated settings. Such tools and techniques can allow authentic, intense network defensive efforts and comprehensive after-action reviews to support individual and group learning, similar to the methods employed in combat arms training environments.
Several organizations sponsor cyber events using these techniques, which have even proven effective for training less experienced operators. The U. S.
CyberChallenge conducts nation-wide competitions for college and high-school students to attract young Americans to the technical cybersecurity workforce.
According to its Executive Director, competitions support skill development, build experience and motivation, and provide a "safe" environment to test out new cyber skills. 35 Another expert on cyber competitions explained that "passion is unlocked by competition" and when cybersecurity is seen as a type of sport, one develops a "cyberathlete/warrior" who will dive deeper into the tradecraft of network operations and defense to gain better skills. 36 These measures allow the workforce to scrutinize enemy and friendly methods during training and learn what works.
One reason simulation, competition and other realistic training approaches are so effective is that they conform to cognitive science theories of learning. For example, one series of experiments at UCLA found that people "remember things better, longer, if they are given very challenging tests…at which they are bound to fail." 37 Realistic simulations can provide an ideal environment for such learning. Another theory of constructivist learning postulates that students learn best within environments where they can explore and discover meaning for themselves, vice being fed information by an instructor. In this model, students are challenged to learn-by-doing; simulations can provide environments for 'situated learning' that focus students on the utility of acquired knowledge in real-world situations; and for 'problem-based learning' where students learn new information and skills by tackling complex problems. 38 Experts at the National Board of Information Security Examiners cite cognitive science developments to postulate that simulation and cyber competitions have "shown the potential…to both develop and assess cybersecurity skills" in part by providing a "working knowledge of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by advanced or leading attackers. This knowledge helps us properly adjust security methods." 39 In short, the data indicate that student learning and development are best supported in realistic contexts and active learning environments. 40 Realism in practice and evaluation is effective and is an essential underpinning of a 'Cyber Sentry' development regime. DOD organizations are aware of many of these realities. Some DOD units are involved in cyber competitions, cyber range training and realistic venues for unit training, testing and evaluation. Such efforts support a variety of training goals for DOD cyber defenders. 41 However, these DOD activities are not required by the Manual for individual member evaluation and credentialing, undermining realism across the force.
Through the required usage of new tools and techniques, DOD can develop realistic training and evaluation for all cyber operators. Just as important, these methods must be adversary-focused to ensure network operations account for new threats and capabilities. In the end, it is the enemy, not the Manual or any certification authority, that defines the success of DOD's cybersecurity workforce. Learning how to adapt to a dynamic adversary and environment is fundamental to success. However, such training must be tied to the roles that Cyber Sentries will perform to ensure the integrity of the training regime.
Linking Authorities to Certifications. In that regard, a second imperative for change in the Manual demands that authority in network operations and defense must be coupled with a proven ability to make decisions and take actions appropriate to the threat and situation. Every cybersecurity operator must be viewed as a sentry on guard within the network-untrained sentinels are a dangerous liability. Therefore, the authority associated with elevated network administration privileges must be grantedand revoked-in accordance with proven performance throughout one's career.
Cyber network operations and security clearly constitute a vital technical field for DOD; for instance, the recently released Joint Operational Access Concept states that "Space and cyberspace are now essential …For these reasons, a joint force conducting force projection must protect its access to space and cyberspace capabilities." 42 Yet current accreditation standards seem insufficient in view of the operational requirements and threats. While certification standards are rigorous, the Manual allows up to six months of supervised operation without certification. Supervision standards and compliance mechanisms are not well defined in the DOD Directive. Notably, DOD components have not met compliance goals set by the Department for certifying their cybersecurity populations. 43 The danger is obvious; as cyber-attacks proliferate, network operators may be required to make critical decisions to defend a cyber system with little warning or preparation. Sun Tzu warns, if personnel "are unaccustomed to rigorous drilling they will be worried and hesitant in battle." 44 One cannot expect the cyber workforce to perform at such high levels if high standards are not demanded and enforced.
Other technical fields, including healthcare, aviation, and heavy equipment Critically, uncertified pilots are considered students who operate under strict limitations and specific supervision conditions. Certification is the threshold that demonstrates attainment of requisite knowledge, skill, aeronautical experience, and commitment to properly exercise the privilege of one's authorizations. 45 In the aviation field, authority to perform is tied to demonstrated ability to perform, embodied in the training and credentialing system.
Aviation and cybersecurity are not directly comparable in many respects, but the technical nature of the professions and the implications of failure are similar enough to conclude that credentialing conventions similar to those in aviation would be advantageous for the cyber defense community. 46 Authority to operate should be predicated on one's demonstrated knowledge and experience to perform a specific role.
Uncertified personnel should be considered students who would have strict limitations on their access to live networks until they complete the evaluation and experience prerequisites for certification. Post-certification currency standards should ensure that cybersecurity professionals renew or recertify on perishable technical skills and remain abreast of new technology and adversary techniques. This more stringent system would link privileged access and authority to training and credentials so that every Cyber Sentry is prepared to act in defense of DOD networks when required.
Developing a Standard of Professional Ethics. However, the cybersecurity workforce's ability and authority to act in defense of DOD networks must be guided by a professional ethos to ensure consistent behavior within agreed upon standards. This reveals a third imperative for workforce development: cyber operators must be well versed in the ethical requirements of the cybersecurity profession. Ethical training is common for ethical hackers who test friendly networks to identify weaknesses, while certification associations often promulgate ethical codes of conduct for their members.
However, DOD lacks a comprehensive cyber ethics code and associated training to ensure cyber professionals use their important skills responsibly. Since any cyber operator could potentially take actions that are harmful or even illegal within their networks, the entire workforce warrants training to instill an 'ethic of restraint' to operate within the law and professional boundaries.
An ethic of restraint is important to prevent criminal and unethical behavior. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) Internet Crime Report for 2010 identified computer crimes as among the most common internet threats. 47 Criminal use of computer network resources may include efforts to attack the computers of others; to use computers as a way to commit crimes, such as fraud; or to use computers to store illegal or stolen information, such as intellectual property. 48 Clearly, immoral end users, hackers, and criminal insiders may use legitimate or illegal access to perform illicit acts or even cause major damage within a network. However, cyber personnel with access to advanced network resources and information about users, accounts and systems can perform similar or even more detrimental activities. It is important, therefore, that all cybersecurity personnel understand unlawful and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace and be trained to act appropriately.
Beyond this, however, the DOD cybersecurity workforce requires an 'ethic of accountability', that is, a code of professional responsibility to protect DOD networks and a moral obligation to personally act in this effort. This is necessary because cyber operators, particularly those in technical roles, often cause or fail to remediate vulnerabilities in their networks. A SANS Institute whitepaper on insider threats reports "One of the main causes of monetary losses to organizations is errors and omissions accidentally and/or unknowingly made by employees, which can present an even larger problem than intentional sabotage." 49 Furthermore, employee errors, particularly those of cyber operators, can also cause loss of personal data and intellectual property, the compromise of systems or denial of network service availability. A survey of experts from the Sandia National Laboratories Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDART) program revealed that system administrators commit a variety of deliberate routine network violations, and "typically don't follow all the rules, especially with regards to firewalls" and network perimeters designed to protect computer systems. 50 In fact, the survey revealed that administrator shortcuts are generally more damaging than normal end user indiscretions, yet system administrators tend to view their own violations as unintentional or justifiable. Common violations included improper password usage, creation of "backdoors" to bypass network security systems, and failure to perform routine security-related duties. Task overload was identified as a major reason for these trends, but so was culture. Experts claimed some cyber operators thought they were exempt from network rules due to their superior security knowledge, the pressure of their roles, or their perception of security tasks as boring or a low priority. 51 In the end, these attitudes simply facilitate network vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries. Nevertheless, there are risks and concerns with any redesign of the Department's current cybersecurity training methodology. These warrant attention to determine whether significant changes are feasible and acceptable.
Alternative Views
The training and certification upgrades identified above would be a major step toward improved performance for DOD's cybersecurity workforce. However, some argue that certifications may not be worth the cost, time, or resources. 52 An analyst from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates it may cost nearly $40 million to certify the federal cyber workforce and an additional $6 million annually to maintain these certifications based on current DOD 8570.01M standards. 53 Expanding certification requirements through additional training, testing or new certifications may further escalate these costs. Moreover, increased training time and higher standards may disqualify many within the current workforce and reduce DOD's pool of available cyber personnel and recruits. Also, while a National Cyber Range facility presently exists that may provide a virtual environment to meet some of the proposed stipulations, it is possible that even more training venues and resources will be necessary.
These are significant concerns. Nevertheless, these may be mitigated in several instances. The population requiring the proposed certifications would remain roughly the same as that presently mandated by the Manual. As with existing standards, the current cyber workforce must be provided an opportunity to meet the new guidelines once implemented in policy. However, for both new accessions and current cyber personnel, better training should result in a high certification success rate to maintain a sufficient population. Improved training realism, techniques and technology may better facilitate learning and moderate training duration. Also, while it is true that additional training resources may be necessary, many existing network venues and low cost tools may be utilized to support enhanced training, thereby limiting some costs. Additional rigor in training, testing and certification as proposed above will likely lead to a more favorable cost-benefit analysis, particularly in view of the continued cost of attacks against DOD networks.
Another concern is that independent DOD action to change its certification, training and authority policies may have adverse impacts on the Interagency and commercial entities. For example, other federal agencies require interoperability with DOD networks and therefore may be affected by DOD workforce modifications.
Additionally, since both industry certification groups and the cybersecurity industry are heavily invested in DOD cybersecurity, impacts to these partners and their constituents must also be considered. As well, Congress has considered the issue of strengthening cyber workforce requirements for over two years; the Senate has introduced draft legislation regarding cybersecurity and internet freedom. 54 Some might suggest workforce quality improvement simply by directing a lowcost apprenticeship program and more performance testing requirements in DOD 8570.01M. Such a plan would have to be more stringent than current regulations but could theoretically benefit the Department without incurring significant costs or changes to the Manual. Yet, fiscal obligations are already projected to rise to meet existing Manual requirements with uncertain effects on workforce competency. 55 Opportunities for apprenticeship exist today, but suffer from the current lack of supervision standards, lack of training realism and insufficient certified "masters" to teach novices and journeymen. And, without a specific focus on the adversary, operators may still have difficulty transitioning from training to the network environment. In short, any security gains would be difficult to quantify against the additional resources and effort required.
Overall, while there are a number of potential concerns with upgrading the current cyber training and certification regime, the above examination demonstrates that the most significant issues can either be mitigated or discounted. Alternative concepts also fall short of satisfying the training needs of the cyber community.
Recommendation
Clearly, the cybersecurity workforce development process warrants upgrades.
To realize the goal of creating Cyber Sentries, the Department must take concrete steps to implement change. DOD must amend DOD 8570.01M to require simulation and other realistic training activities; deny access to privileged user status until certification is complete; and incorporate an ethics requirement in training programs. These actions will update the Manual to meet the CJCS directive for realistic training prior to entering into military operations. To implement this guidance, knowledge, skill, ability and ethical standards must be developed for each cyber role to ensure that the new requirements are incorporated appropriately within the career development pipeline. 56 Toward this end, the US National Institute for Science and Technology draft cybersecurity workforce framework, which standardizes roles with associated tasks and skills, can serve as an outline for DOD efforts. 57 The Manual will also need to delineate authorities associated with each role and certification, as well as "currency" requirements to ensure training remains up-to-date.
Beyond these actions, the Department will also need to develop several supporting products. A DOD cyber ethics code is necessary to guide actions across the workforce. Simulation tools, cyber challenges, cyber ranges and other capabilities must be distributed appropriately to support DOD training efforts. Synchronization with the intelligence community will be important to enable a constant focus on the adversary and the dynamic cyber environment. Training systems and standards are needed to support currency requirements. Authority should be extended to Inspector General and Operational Test and Evaluation organizations to monitor compliance and support standards. Most important, all DOD actions must be coordinated with government and industry partners to ensure success at each step. Only then can the Department obtain and synchronize the support framework necessary to implement this new concept.
Conclusion
The President has categorized cybersecurity as a critical national security issue and has identified the digital workforce as a critical aspect of reducing risk in cyberspace. 58 DOD has developed a cyberspace operating strategy that includes the "development and retention of an exceptional cyber workforce." 59 Success in developing such quality would allow the Department to exploit the talent and ingenuity of our human capital toward generating a competitive advantage in cyberspace operations. DOD could then also serve as an example and assistant to partners in industry, academia and foreign governments. However, failure to improve the workforce may signal a lack of resolve to the American public, our partners, and our adversaries. Most important, without progress in workforce development, the Department simply may not be able to counter the increasingly capable malicious attacks against DOD network infrastructure.
The Defense Department must ensure the long-term utility and security of DOD networks in the face of increasingly sophisticated state-and non-state cyber threats by developing an exceptional cyber workforce. This paper examined the current impediments to effective cybersecurity workforce preparation and offered new concepts to create Cyber Sentries through realistic training, network authorities tied to
